Abstract. Renormalization group (RG) methods are an established strategy to explain how it is possible that microscopically different systems exhibit virtually the same macro behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. I argue -in agreement with Robert Batterman -that RG explanations are non-causal explanations. However, Batterman misidentifies the reason why RG explanations are non-causal: it is not the case that an explanation is noncausal if it ignores causal details. I propose an alternative argument, according to which RG explanations are non-causal explanations because their explanatory power is due to the application mathematical operations, which do not serve the purpose of representing causal relations.
Introduction
epistemic problem with the Hamiltonian of a 'real' physical system undergoing phase transition (say, a heating pot of water) is that each component of such a system does not merely interact with its nearby neighbors but also with distant components. Hence, keeping track of the interaction between all the components of, say, a liquid undergoing phase transitions is -given the large number of components -epistemically intractable.
Second Step: Transformations
The second element of the RG explanation deals with this epistemic intractability: a particular transformation on the Hamiltonian (the "renormalization group transformation"; henceforth, RG transformation). Batterman describes the purpose of this kind of transformation as […] chang [ing] an initial physical Hamiltonian describing a real system into another Hamiltonian in the space [of possible Hamiltonians]. The transformation preserves, to certain extent, the form of the original Hamiltonian so that when the thermodynamic parameters are properly adjusted (renormalized) the new renormalized Hamiltonian describes a system exhibiting similar behavior. (Batterman 2000, 126-127) Operations such as spatial contraction and the renormalization of parameters that are involved in RG transformations allow to represent one and the same fluid F in a different way: the number of interacting components of F (or degrees of freedom) is effectively reduced. That is, the transformed Hamiltonian of F describes the interaction of fewer components (or fewer degrees of freedom). Repeatedly applying RG transformations amounts to a description of the system, say fluid F, on larger and larger length scales; the RG transformation is a coarse-graining procedure. 5 Carrying out the transformation repeatedly comes with an epistemic benefit:
[…] the transformation effects a reduction in the number of coupled components or degrees of freedom within the correlation length. Thus, the new renormalized Hamiltonian describes a system that presents a more tractable problem and is easier to deal with. By repeated application of this renormalization group transformation the problem becomes more and more tractable […] . (Batterman 2000, 126f) In other words, the RG transformation solves the epistemic problem of intractability (see above). Essentially, RG-transformations eliminate micro-details irrelevant for the explanation of phase-transitions.
Third
Step: Flow of Hamiltonians Using Batterman's terminology, suppose we start with the "initial physical manifold" or, equivalently, the "real physical" Hamiltonian H of a fluid F (undergoing a phase transition 5 Shimony (1993, 208) discussed RG transformations and their applicability conditions. near the critical temperature). Then one repeatedly applies the RG transformation and obtains other Hamiltonians describing the same system F with fewer component interactions than H. Interestingly, these different Hamiltonians "flow" into the same fixed point (in the space of possible Hamiltonians), which describes a specific behavior characterized by a critical exponent (Batterman 2000, 143) . Now suppose there is another fluid F* and its behavior (during phase transition) is described by the initial Hamiltonian H*. Repeatedly applying the RG transformation to H* generates other, equivalent
Hamiltonians (with fewer component interactions than H*). If the Hamiltonians representing fluid F* and fluid F turn out to "flow" to the same fixed point, then their behavior, when undergoing phase transition, is characterized by the same critical exponent (Fisher 1982, 85; Batterman 2000, 143) .
Hence, we have arrived at the explanandum of an RG explanation: the three elements of an RG explanation provide a method to determine under which conditions two microscopically different systems (that is, systems with different initial "real physical"
Hamiltonians) belong to the same "universality class", i.e. are characterized by the same critical exponent (Fisher 1982, 87) . Two systems belong to the same universality class, if reiterating RG transformations reveals that both systems "flow" to the same fixed point.
Batterman certainly has a point when he claims the RG method explains by showing how various details about component interactions are irrelevant for the macro-behavior of systems (Batterman 2000, 127) . RG explanations do not merely reveal what is irrelevant but also provide information about what is relevant for a specific macro-behavior.
Batterman verbatim:
For instance it turns out that that the critical exponent can be shown to depend on the spatial dimension of the system and on the symmetry properties of the order parameter. So, for example, systems with one spatial dimension or quasi-one dimensional systems such as polymers, exhibit different exponents that (quasi-) two dimensional systems like films. (Batterman 2000, 127) This is, roughly, how Batterman thinks that RG explanations of universal behavior work. I have no ambition to challenge his exposition. The main question of this paper is whether any of the three elements of an RG explanation warrants a non-causal interpretation of such an explanation. 
Against Batterman's Anti-causal Argument
Batterman presents a principled objection -his anti-causal argument -to subsuming RG explanations under the causal models of scientific explanation. Batterman's main argument 6 I will not address two separable issues regarding RG explanations: (1) whether RG explanations are reductive explanations and (2) which role limit theorems play in RG explanations. Some philosophers have recently argued -contra Batterman (2002) causal "micro details" because an explanation provides "detailed causal-mechanical accounts of the workings of the mechanisms leading to the occurrence of the explanandum phenomenon" (Batterman 2000, 28) . A causal explanation "tells us all of the gory details" (ibid.) about why a particular effect occurs (Batterman 2010, 2 and 21) . However, ignoring certain details about the interactions of components of a physical system seems to be essential for the second step of the RG explanation (that is, the RG transformations).
Batterman concludes that the causal model of scientific explanation cannot accommodate RG explanations.
To be fair, suppose that causal relations are characterized by the so-called 'folk role' Second, Batterman's characterization of the causal model of scientific explanationthat is, not being able to ignore details -is inaccurate as a general characterization. This characterization applies only to a specific version of the causal account (such a Railton's account, to which Batterman alludes; Batterman 2002, 28) . In contrast to Batterman's view, a number of recent influential causal models of explanation are explicitly designed to account for the fact that many excellent scientific explanations "ignore details". For instance, Strevens (2008) and Franklin-Hall (manuscript) explicitly deny that explanation merely consists in citing causes; they add an "optimizing procedure" (Strevens) and a "biggest bang-for-your-buck" principle (Franklin-Hall), which are procedures to omit irrelevant causal information. Woodward's (2010) Batterman, to RG explanations. I will not pursue this strategy. My main reason not to pursue this strategy is that causal explanation can, at best, explain why a particular behavior of a system, say a fluid F, occurs by citing a cause or an underlying causal micromechanism. This seems to hold independently of whether a causal explanation abstracts from details or not. As a matter of fact, Strevens, Franklin-Hall and Woodward are primarily and explicitly concerned with the question how one can simplify a systemspecific causal model, why the behavior of one kind of a system depends on few macrovariables, and exactly how one can reasonably abstract from the micro details of one kind of system. For instance, Strevens (2003 Strevens ( , 2008 cares about methodological principles enabling ecologists to ignore certain causal micro-details of the interactions between a specific population of foxes and a specific population of rabbits and to, ultimately, determine a small number of macro-variables, which can be used to explain and predict the growth of these specific populations of foxes and rabbits. Call questions of this kind 'system-specific question'. Let us grant that these philosophers provide satisfactory answers to these system-specific questions. However, it is at least not obvious that causal models of explanation are also suited to successfully address the question why two different systems with different underlying causal mechanisms, say two fluids F and F*, display the same macro-behavior (similarly, Batterman 2002, 23-24) . The point I wish to stress is that it is, at least, a challenge even for those causal models of explanation with an in-built abstraction principle to accommodate RG explanations, because the latter address the question why micro-causally different systems behave similarly on the macro-level. Call this challenge the 'inter-systems challenge'. I take this challenge to be good enough to motivate a different reaction to the failure of Batterman's anti-causal argument.
I explore a second strategy, according to which the conclusion of Batterman's anticausal argument is true (that is, RG explanations are non-causal explanations) and this conclusion is supported by an alternative argument. The next section elaborates the alternative argument for the claim that RG explanation is not causal (in addition to the inter-systems objection presented in the previous paragraph) and provides a positive characterization of non-causal explanations.
RG Explanation as Mathematical Explanation
In order to decide whether RG explanations are non-causal one needs a criterion to distinguish causal and (at least some sorts of) non-causal explanations. Marc Lange (2012) provides a useful candidate for such a criterion. Lange argues that one ought to distinguish (a) explanations that explain in virtue of describing cause-effect relations in the world and (b) explanations whose explanatory powers stems from "distinctively mathematical" facts.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, let me clarify that I will not adopt Lange's approach straightforwardly. Instead I propose an amended and enriched account of mathematical explanation, which preserves only some of Lange's core ideas and includes one of Batterman's (2010) core insights regarding mathematical explanations. It is argued that this account of mathematical explanation provides good reasons to believe that RG explanations are non-causal explanations because of being mathematical explanations.
Lange illustrates how a mathematical explanation works by using the following toy 7 example: the empirical fact that Marc has three children and twenty-three strawberries, and the distinctively mathematical fact that twenty-three cannot be divided evenly by three, explains why Marc failed when he tried a moment ago to distribute his strawberries evenly among his children without cutting any. Lange points out that a distinctively mathematical explanation may include some causal information. For instance, the explanation may include information about which beliefs and desires regarding his three children caused Marc to distribute the strawberries, information about the proper functioning of physiological mechanism of his body and the bodies of his children during the time that the distribution of strawberries takes etc. For the purposes of this paper, it is instructive that Lange thinks of causal information -in the context of mathematical explanations -as a presupposition of the explanation-seeking why-question (Lange 2012, 13). For instance, in 7 Lange (2012, 18-19) also discusses a scientific example in detail: a distinctively mathematical explanation of why a simple double pendulum has four equilibrium configurations.
the case of the strawberry example the why question is: presupposing that Marc's beliefs and desires caused him to distribute the strawberries and presupposing the proper functioning of physiological mechanism of his body and the bodies of his children during the time of the distribution etc., why did Marc fail to distribute the strawberries evenly? The explanation of why he failed to distribute the strawberries evenly among his three children is, however, non-causal, as the explanatory force is exclusively derived from a distinctively mathematical fact (that is, the fact that twenty-three cannot be divided evenly by three). In other words, if an explanation derives its explanatory power from distinctively mathematical facts (and not from a description of causes of the explanandum), then the explanation is non-causal.
I anticipate a worry at this point. One might be concerned that 'appealing to mathematics' is not sufficient for rendering an explanation non-causal. This would be a devastating result for an account of mathematical explanation. However, it is, of course, not the case -and Lange explicit repeatedly stresses this point -that if an explanation is formulated in terms of mathematics, then it is non-causal. One can appeal to the folk Taking this worry into account, I adopt the following preliminary definition of a non-causal explanation that will be refined later on: an explanation is non-causal iff the explanans contains at least one non-causal element e, and e ensures the success of the explanation. In the case of a mathematical explanation, the non-causal component e is a claim stating a mathematical fact (e.g. that twenty-three cannot be divided by three). As I discuss in more detail below, my disagreement with Lange concerns the question whether Lange's 'distinctively' mathematical facts exhaust the class of explanatory non-causal mathematical facts. Following Batterman (2010) , I argue that the class of explanatory facts also includes (contingent) facts about the applicability of mathematical operations.
Let us see if this criterion helps to decide whether RG explanations are non-causal in virtue of being distinctively mathematical. I will go through the three steps of an RG explanation. The first element of an RG explanation is the Hamiltonian of a system. Since the Hamiltonian describes the interaction between the components of a system (a gas, a fluid, a magnet) this component contains causal information. 8 Hence, this step of an RG explanation is at least unlikely to warrant a non-causal interpretation of RG explanations.
Do the remaining two steps of an RG explanation warrant a non-causal qua mathematical interpretation? Recall that the fact to be explains is why it is the case that two systems S and S* -which are microscopically different and, therefore, characterized by different Hamiltonians H and H* -exhibit the same macro behavior when undergoing phase transitions. To see that the demand for an explanation is to an extent independent of the Hamiltonians, one is able to phrase the explanation-seeking why-question in the following way: the Hamiltonians H and H* play the role of, to adopt Lange's terminology, presuppositions of the explanation-seeking why-question. That is, presupposing that S has the initial Hamiltonian H and S* has the initial Hamiltonian H*, why is it the case that S and S* display universal macro-behavior (characterized by the same critical exponent)? As in the strawberry case, the explanation-seeking why-question presupposes that a particular causal structure is in place. In the strawberry case, the presupposition concerns beliefs and desires that are effective, the working of physiological mechanisms etc.; in the RG case, it is presupposed that Hamiltonians describe the causal interactions among the components of a system. I argue that the RG-answer to this why-question is mathematical. The mathematical explanatory power is derived from the remaining two elements of an RG explanation: the transformations and flow of Hamiltonians. If this is correct, then RG 8 For brevity's sake and for the sake of the argument, I ignore Russellian arguments here, according to which fundamental physical laws are not causal laws (Price and Corry 2007).
non-causal.
I anticipate another worry at this point. One might object that extending Lange's account by allowing mathematical facts and operations to be explanatory misses a crucial feature of Lange's notion of distinctively mathematical explanations. Namely, it leaves out the feature that distinctively mathematical facts possess a kind of modality that is stronger than physical modality. For example, Lange appeals to an explanatory mathematical fact, according to which it is metaphysically necessary (and not merely physically necessary)
that twenty-three cannot be evenly divided by three. 10 By contrast, a mathematical operation (such as an RG transformation) does not apply to a physical system with metaphysical necessity; such an operation applies given physically contingent conditions (Shimony 1993, 208) . In response, I do not deny that -given the strawberry case and the RG case -there is such a difference in the modal character of the explanatory facts, but I do not follow Lange in taking metaphysical necessity as the distinctive feature of (non-causal) explanatory mathematics. Instead it is my claim, for which I will argue in the remainder of this section, that one need not appeal to metaphysical necessity in order to claim that mathematical facts explain in a non-causal way. All one needs to establish is that the mathematics does not explain by referring to causal facts (that is, facts about relations that count as causal in the light of the folk notion of causation). Philosophers who are skeptical 10 However, when discussing the distinctively mathematical explanation of the behavior of a simple double pendulum, Lange weakens this condition and acknowledges instances of distinctively mathematical explanations, according to which the relevant explanatory mathematics is "not a mathematical, conceptual, metaphysical, or logical truth" (Lange 2012, 20) . 
Conclusion
I started out with the demand for an explanation of how it is possible that microscopically different systems exhibit virtually the same macro-behavior when undergoing phasetransitions. A well-established explanation of this phenomenon in physics are RG methods.
The main goal of this paper was to argue -in agreement with Batterman -that RG explanations are non-causal explanations. It was argued that Batterman misidentifies the reason why RG explanations are non-causal: he is wrong to claim that if an explanation ignores causal (micro) details, then it is not a causal explanation. I proposed an alternative argument for the claim that RG explanations are non-causal explanations. RG explanations are non-causal explanations because their explanatory power is due to the application of mathematical operations, which do not serve the purpose of representing causal relations.
